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Abstract. A workflow (WF) is a formal description of a business pro-
cess in which single atomic work units (tasks), organized in a partial
order, are assigned to processing entities (agents) in order to achieve
some business goal(s). A workflow management system must coordinate
the execution of tasks and WF instances. Usually, the assignment of tasks
to agents is accomplished by external constraints not represented in a
WF. An access-controlled workflow (ACWF) extends a classical WF by
explicitly representing agent availability for each task and authorization
constraint. Authorization constraints model which users are authorized
for which tasks depending on “who did what”. Recent research has ad-
dressed temporal controllability of WFs under conditional and temporal
uncertainty. However, controllability analysis for ACWFs under condi-
tional uncertainty has never been addressed before. In this paper, we
define weak, strong and dynamic controllability of ACWFs under con-
ditional uncertainty, we present algorithmic approaches to address each
of these types of controllability, and we synthesize execution strategies
that specify which user has been (or will be) assigned to which task.
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1 Introduction
Context and motivation. A workflow schema (or simply workflow, WF ) is a
formal description of a business process in which single atomic work units (tasks),
organized in a partial order, are assigned to processing entities (agents) in order
to achieve some business goal(s). A workflow management system (WfMS) must
coordinate the execution of tasks and WF instances. Usually, the assignment of
agents to tasks considers external constraints not represented in a WF [11].
An access-controlled workflow (ACWF) extends a classical WF by adding
users and authorization constraints. Users are authorized for tasks whereas au-
thorization constraints say which users remain authorized for which tasks de-
pending on who did what.
The conceptual modeling of WFs underlying business processes has been
receiving increasing attention over the last years and many technical aspects
have been discussed, including WF flexibility, structured vs. unstructured mod-
eling, change management, authorization models, and temporal features and
constraints (see, e.g., [4,15,17]). Recently, attention has been devoted to the is-
sue of expressing temporal features of WFs, such as task-duration constraints,
temporal constraints between non-consecutive tasks, deadlines and so on. More-
over, properties of such temporal WF models have been defined and analyzed.
The most interesting property is dynamic controllability, which ensures that a
WF can be executed satisfying all the given temporal constraints without the
WfMS restricting and/or controlling task durations but only assuming that each
such duration is within a designed range (temporal uncertainty) [4]. The authors
of [4] also tackled dynamic controllability under another uncertainty, conditional
uncertainty, represented by the fact that some subsets of tasks have to be ex-
ecuted if and only if some conditions (abstracted as Boolean propositions) are
true. Similarly to what happens for uncontrollable task durations, the truth-
value assignments to such propositions are out of control. For instance, when a
patient enters the ER, the severity of his condition is not known a priory but it is
established by a physician, while the WF is being executed. Since such a condi-
tion discriminates what tasks have, or have not, to be executed, the system must
be able to get to the end of the WF satisfying all relevant temporal constraints
regardless of which tasks have to be executed and which task durations have to
be satisfied. However, to the best of our knowledge, controllability analysis of
(non-temporal) ACWFs (e.g., those presented in [17]) remains unexplored.
Contributions. Towards this aim, our contributions are four-fold: (1) We
define ACWFs under conditional uncertainty as a structured extension of a frag-
ment of BPMN. (2) We define weak, strong and dynamic controllability of an
ACWF under conditional uncertainty. (3) We provide an encoding from WF–
paths into binary constraint networks and exploit directional consistency algo-
rithms to check the consistency of a single (unconditional) path. (4) We present
algorithmic approaches for the three kinds of controllability and we synthesize
execution strategies that specify which user has been (or will be) assigned to
which task.
Organization. §2 introduces a motivating example that we will use through-
out the paper. § 3 gives essential background on structured WFs and constraint
networks. § 4 introduces ACWFs under conditional uncertainty, and § 5 dis-
cusses weak, strong and dynamic controllability of such ACWFs. § 6 gives an
encoding from WF-paths into constraint networks. § 7 discusses the algorithmic
approaches to the three kinds of controllability. § 8 discusses related work. § 9
draws conclusions and discusses future work.
2 A Motivating Example
As a running, motivating example coming from the health-care domain, we con-





























Fig. 1: An excerpt of a simplified triage WF schema. Head = {B}, EV-Resp =
{A, C}, ER-Phy = {D, E}, Subst = {C, D}, TH-Resp = {A, E}.
modified it and added some access control to get a few features of interest that
we want to discuss. Fig. 1 shows an ACWF under conditional uncertainty having
6 tasks, 5 roles (EV-Resp, ER-Phy, Subst, TH-Resp and Head) and 5 users (Alice,
Bob, Charlie, David and Eve). EV-Resp contains Alice and Charlie, ER-Phy
contains David and Eve, Subst contains Charlie and David, TH-Resp contains
Alice and Eve, Head contains only Bob. Head is senior to all roles besides ER-Phy.
Thus, Head is authorized for all tasks except for EM-Treat.
The ACWF starts with a cardiological evaluation (CardioEv) and a neurolog-
ical evaluation (NeuroEv) where an evaluation-responsible (EV-Resp) establishes
whether the patient is in need of immediate medical attention. The order of these
two tasks does not matter. However, this example requires that CardioEv and
NeuroEv are not executed simultaneously. Hereinafter, we will assume, without
loss of generality, that in the considered executions CardioEv happens before
NeuroEv. The physicians executing these two tasks must be different.
After this initial parallel block terminates (and consequently the level of
emergency has been assessed), the flow of execution splits in two (mutually-
exclusive) paths. If the patient needs immediate medical attention (Emergency? =
>), then an ER-physician (ER-Phy) executes an emergency treatment (EM-Treat),
and afterwards a substitute (Subst) takes care of the ICU-Hospitalization pro-
cess (ICU-Hosp). This last physician must be the same who did CardioEv and
must be different from the one who has just concluded EM-Treat. Instead, if
Emergency? = ⊥, then a therapy-responsible (TH-Resp) carries out a standard
therapy. This physician must be the same who did CardioEv.
Regardless of which WF-path (see §5) has been taken, the process concludes
with a discharge letter (DischLet) released by a Subst who must be different
from, and not a relative of, the physician who did CardioEv (we shorten it in
Fig. 1 as 6= ∧¬Rel). Alice and Bob, who are married, are the only relatives
in this example. Furthermore, assume that Emergency? = >; if ICU-Hosp was
executed by Bob (respectively, Charlie), then DischLet will be executed by
Charlie (respectively, Bob); we shorten it in Fig. 1 as ρ1. Conversely, assume




















Fig. 2: A fragment of a structured BPMN.
will be executed by David (we shorten it in Fig. 1 as ρ2). In the rest of the paper,
we will shorten Alice, Bob, Charlie, David and Eve as A, B, C, D and E.
3 Background
In this section, we give useful background on structured WFs and constraint
networks (CNs), a formalism to model the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP).
3.1 Structured Workflows
In this paper, we consider an excerpt of BPMN restricting the analysis on loop-
free WFs and following the structured approach of the conceptual model Nest-
Flow [3], where the specification of a WF is given by a WF schema, a directed
graph (also called WF graph) where nodes correspond to activities and arcs rep-
resent the control flow defining dependencies between the order of execution of
such activities. There exist two different types of activity: tasks (rounded boxes)
and connectors (diamonds). Tasks represent elementary work units that cannot
be decomposed further and that will be executed by external agents. Connectors
(or gateways in BPMN) represent internal activities executed by the WfMS to
achieve a correct and coordinated execution of tasks.
Since we focus on access control, connectors are restricted to being of two
types: total (+) and conditional split (×). A connector is conditional when it
splits a single flow of execution in exactly two mutually-exclusive branches or
it joins two mutually-exclusive branches into a single one. A connector is total
when it splits the flow of the execution into n > 1 parallel branches or it joins
n > 1 incoming parallel branches into a single outgoing flow.
Fig. 2 depicts the basic components of a business process. Each component
can be thought of as a symbol in a context-free grammar. In particular, PROCESS
(Fig. 2a) can be thought of as the starting symbols of such a grammar embedding
the non-terminal symbol block 〈B〉. A non-terminal block can be a Sequence
(Fig. 2b), a Parallel (Fig. 2e) or a Choice (Fig. 2f), whereas a terminal block
can be a Task (Fig. 2c) or Skip (Fig. 2d).
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3.2 Constraint Networks and the Constraint Satisfaction Problem
Definition 1 (CN, CSP and consistency [7]). A Constraint Network (CN)
R is a triple 〈X,D,C〉, where X = {x1, . . . , xn} is a finite set of variables,
D = {D1, . . . , Dn} is a set of associated domains Di = {v1, . . . , vj} (one for
each variable), and C = {C1, . . . , Ck} is a finite set of constraints. Each Ci is a
relation Ri defined over a scope of variables Si ⊆ X (i.e., if Si = {xi1 , . . . , xir},
then Ri ⊆ Di1 × · · · × Dir). A Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) is the
problem of assigning a value vi ∈ Di to each variable xi ∈ X such that all
constraints in C are satisfied. If this is possible, then the CN is consistent.
CSP is NP-hard [7]. A CN is binary if all constraints have scope cardinality
≤ 2 (in general, k-ary if all constraints have scope cardinality ≤ k) [7,13]. Let
Rij be a shortcut to represent a binary relation having scope S = {xi, xj}.
A binary CN is minimal if any tuple (vi, vj) ∈ Rij ∈ C belongs to at least
one global solution for the underlying CSP [13]. Thus, a minimal CN models
an n-ary relation whose scope is X and whose tuples represent the set of all
solutions. Besides for a few restricted classes of CNs, the general process of
computing a minimal network is NP-hard [13]. Furthermore, even considering
a binary minimal network, the problem of generating an arbitrary solution is
NP-hard if there is no total order on the variables [10].
Therefore, a first crude technique is that of searching for a solution by ex-
haustively enumerating (and testing) all possible solutions and stopping as soon
as one satisfies all constraints in C. This initial idea entailed the employment of
more sophisticated techniques such as backtracking combined to heuristics such
as node, arc and path consistency (pruning techniques) [12].
A variable xi is node-consistent if for each v ∈ Di we have that v ∈ Rxi .
A CN is node-consistent if each variable is node-consistent. A variable xi is
arc-consistent with respect to a second variable xj if for each v ∈ Di there
exists u ∈ Dj such that (v, u) ∈ Rij . A CSP instance is arc-consistent if every
variable is arc-consistent with respect to any other variable. A pair of variables
(xi, xj) is path-consistent with respect to a third variable xk if for any assignment
xi = v, xj = u, where v ∈ Di and u ∈ Dj , there exists k ∈ Dk such that
(v, k) ∈ Rik and (k, u) ∈ Rkj . A CSP instance is path-consistent if any pair of
variables are path-consistent with any other third variable.
k-consistency guarantees that any (locally consistent) assignment to any sub-
set of (k− 1)-variables can be extended to a kth (still unassigned) variable such
that all constraints between these k-variables are satisfied. Strong k-consistency
is k-consistency for each j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k [9]. As a result, 1, 2 and 3-
consistency are node, arc and path consistency, respectively.
Directional consistency has been introduced to speed up the process of syn-
thesizing a solution for a constraint network limiting backtracking [8]. In a nut-
shell, given a total order on the variables of a CN, the network is directional-
consistent if it is consistent with respect to the given order that dictates the
assignment order of variables. In [8], an adaptive-consistency (adc) algorithm
was provided as a directional consistency algorithm adapting the level of k-
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Algorithm 1: adc(R, d)
Input: A constraint network R = 〈X,D,C〉 and an ordering d = {x1, . . . , xn}
Output: A backtrack-free network (along d) if R is consistent, inconsistent otherwise.
1 Partition the constraints as follows:
2 for i← n downto 1 do
3 Put in Bucket(xi) all unplaced constraints mentioning xi
4 for p← n downto 1 do
5 Let j ← |Bucket(xp)| and Si be the scope of RSi ∈ Bucket(xp)
6 A← ⋃ji=1 Si \ {xp}
7 RA ← piA(./ji=1 RSi )
8 if RA is not empty then
9 Bucket(x′)← Bucket(x′) ∪ {RA}, where x′ ∈ A is the “latest” variable w.r.t. d.
10 else
11 return inconsistent
12 return R′ = 〈X,D,⋃ni=1 Bucketi〉
consistency needed to guarantee a backtrack-free search once the algorithm ter-
minates, if the network is not inconsistent (see Algorithm 1). The input of adc
is a CN R = 〈X,D,C〉 along with an order d for the set X. At each step the
algorithm adapts the level of consistency to guarantee that if the network passes
the test, a backtrack-free solution can be generated. If the network is incon-
sistent, the algorithm detects it before the solution generation process starts.
adc initializes a Bucket(xi) for each variable xi and first processes all the vari-
ables top-down (i.e., from last to first in the order d) by filling each bucket with
all (still unplaced) constraints RSi ∈ C whose scope Si contains xi. Then, it
processes again the variables top-down and, for each variable xi, it computes a
new scope A consisting of the union of all scopes of the relations in Bucket(xi)
neglecting xi itself. After that, it computes a new relation RA by joining all
RSi ∈ Bucket(xi) and projecting with respect to A (./ and pi are the classical
relational algebra operators). In this way, it enforces the appropriate level of
consistency. If the resulting relation is empty, then R is inconsistent; otherwise,
the algorithm adds RA to the bucket of the latest variable in A (with respect
to the order d), and goes on by processing the next variable. Finally, it returns
a network R′ (possibly tighter than the initial R) whose set of constraints is
equal to the union of all (tighten) relations in the buckets. Note that adc takes
as input a k-ary CN R and returns a k′-ary CN R′, where k′ ≥ k (an example
of a binary CN turned into a ternary one can be found in [7, chapter 4]).
Time and space complexity of adc are O(n(2z)w?+1) and O(nzw?), respec-
tively, where n = |X|, z = maxi=1,...,n |Di| and w? is the induced width of the
graph along the order of processing [7, chapter 4]. Informally, w? represents the
maximum number of variables that can be affected by the value assumed by
another variable.
4 ACWFs Under Conditional Uncertainty
In this section, we extend the fragment of (the structured) BPMN we discussed in
§3.1 by injecting a role-based access-control model (RBAC, [16]) and formalizing
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authorization constraints at user level into the process specification. We call this
language access-controlled BPMN (ACBPMN). Before we begin, we point out
our assumptions on Choice blocks.
Given a set P of propositional letters, a label ` is any (possibly empty) con-
junction of literals, where a literal is either a propositional letter p ∈ P or its
negation ¬p. The empty label is denoted by  . The label universe of P , denoted
by P ∗, is the set of all possible labels representing all possible (finite) conjunc-
tions of literals we can obtain from P . Two labels `1, `2 ∈ P ∗ are consistent if
and only if their conjunction `1 ∧ `2 is satisfiable.
We assume that each conditional split connector of a Choice block is as-
sociated to a unique proposition p ∈ P whose truth value assignment is not
decided by the WfMS but by some run-time condition. We call such property
conditional uncertainty. That is, the WfMS is only able to observe such a truth
value assignment once the conditional split connector has been executed. We also
assume that all tasks of the WF are implicitly labeled by labels according to the
nesting levels of the Choice blocks. This is implicit since the WF is structured.
For example, in Fig. 2f, the label of each task in B> contains c, whereas that of
each task in B⊥ contains ¬c, where c is a Boolean proposition modeling cond?.
In case of nested conditional blocks (suppose that B> is another Choice block
having sub-blocks F> and F⊥ and split connector associated to f), the labels of
tasks in F> are c ∧ f , whereas those of F⊥ are c ∧ ¬f , and so on.
We formalize the label of each task as a function L : T → P ∗, where T is the
set of tasks. Getting back to our example, we have that P = {e}, where e ab-
stracts Emergency, the condition associated to the (unique) conditional connec-
tor. The labels of the tasks are: L(CardioEv) = L(NeuroEv) =  , L(EM-Treat) =
L(ICU-Hosp) = e, L(STD-Tr) = ¬e and L(DischLet) =  , meaning that all
tasks labeled by   are always executed, and the remaining ones are condition-
ally executed depending on the truth value of their labels.
Definition 2 (Role-Based Access-Control Models for Workflows). The
RBAC part of a business process consists of a finite set of roles R = {r1, . . . , rl},
a finite set of users U = {u1, . . . , um} and a finite set of tasks T = {t1, . . . , tn}.
Roles are associated to both users and tasks, acting as an interface between them.
Formally, UA ⊆ U × R is the many-to-many user-to-role assignment relation,
whereas TA ⊆ T × R is the many-to-many task-to-role assignment relation.
Thus, (u, r) ∈ UA means that u belongs to role r, whereas (t, r) means that
task t can be executed by any user (i.e., agent) belonging to role r. We write
users(r) = {u | (u, r) ∈ UA} for the set of users belonging to a role r, and
roles(t) = {r | (t, r) ∈ TA} for the set of roles authorized for a task t. We abuse
notation and write users(t) = {u | (u, r) ∈ UA∧r ∈ roles(t)} for the set of users
authorized for a task.
Fig. 3 shows the two main extensions to the language given in Fig. 2. We
label a task t by a finite set of roles {r1, . . . , re} ⊆ R (Fig. 3a) meaning that
(t, r1), . . . , (t, re) ∈ TA. Assigning roles to tasks models “who does what”.
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task
(r1, . . . , re)
(a) Task
task1
(ri, . . . , rj)
task2
(rk, . . . , rp)
ρ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ρn
(b) AuthorizationConstraint
Fig. 3: Injecting roles (a) and authorization constraints (b).
However, classical RBAC models are unable to specify security policies at
user level such as separation of duties (SoD) and binding of duties (BoD).3 To
address such an issue, we express authorization constraints between pairs of
tasks t1, t2, having consistent labels
4 L(t1) and L(t2), as a conjunction of binary
relations ρ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ρn over users (ρi ⊆ U × U) such that if u1 ∈ users(t1) and
u2 ∈ users(t2) and the pair (u1, u2) also belongs to all ρi, then any execution
assigning t1 to u1 and t2 to u2 satisfies the authorization constraint. In Fig. 1
L(CardioEv) =   and L(ICU-Hosp) = e are consistent; thus, in the execution
where the conditional split connector assigns > to e, both of these two tasks
must be executed, and the authorization constraint labeled by = (connecting
them) satisfied.
In ACBPMN, we draw authorization constraints as undirected dashed edges
(Fig. 3b) connecting pairs of tasks and label them by a conjunction of binary
relations as we have just discussed. Fig. 1 is an ACWF under conditional un-
certainty expressing which roles are authorized for which tasks, and which are
the authorization constraints. Again, no authorization constraint is specified be-
tween EM-Treat and STD-Tr as L(EM-Treat) = e and L(STD-Tr) = ¬e are
inconsistent with each other.
5 Controllability of ACWFs Under Conditional
Uncertainty
We give the semantics for weak, strong and dynamic controllability of ACWFs un-
der conditional uncertainty. Our goal is that of synthesizing execution strategies
specifying which user to assign to which task so that all relevant authorization
constraints will eventually be satisfied no matter which (uncontrollable) truth
values the conditional connectors assign to their associated propositions. Tasks
and constraints are relevant if the WfMS must consider them during execution.
A scenario (or interpretation function) s : P → {>,⊥} is a complete as-
signment of truth values to the propositions associated to all conditional split
connectors in the Choice blocks. I models the set of all possible scenarios.
In our example, there are two possible (mutually-exclusive) scenarios s1(e) =
> and s2(e) = ⊥, modeling the patient’s urgency level. Once a scenario is se-
lected, the WF-path corresponding to the considered scenario is the projection
of the initial WF with respect to the scenario.
3 SoD is a security policy saying that a subset of tasks must be carried out by different
users, whereas BoD says that a subset of tasks must be carried out by the same user.
4 Two tasks with consistent labels must be considered in at least one WF execution.
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Definition 3 (WF-path). A workflow path (WF-path) is the projection of an
ACWF with respect to a given scenario s; i.e., a new (unconditional) ACWF
obtained as a copy of the considered ACWF, where all tasks and authorization
constraints having label not consistent with s are removed.
The ACWF in Fig. 1 consists of the following two WF-paths
(1) CardioEv→ NeuroEv→ EM-Treat→ ICU-Hosp→ DischLet
(2) CardioEv→ NeuroEv→ STD-Tr→ DischLet
where (1) is the result of the projection according to scenario s1, and (2) to s2.
For both WF-paths, the order of CardioEv and NeuroEv does not matter.
Definition 4 (Schedule). A schedule, for a subset of tasks T ′ ⊆ T , is a map-
ping ψ : T ′ → U assigning users to those tasks. The set of all possible schedules is
represented by Ψ . A schedule is consistent if the assignments it makes eventually
satisfy all relevant authorization constraints.
An execution strategy is a mapping σ : I → Ψ from scenarios to schedules
such that the domain of the resulting ψ consists of all tasks belonging to the
WF-path arising from the projection of the ACWF with respect to s. If ψ = σ(s)
is also consistent, then we say that σ is viable. We denote the user u assigned to
the task t by the strategy σ in the scenario s as [σ(s)]t = u.
The first kind of controllability is weak controllability, which ensures that we
can execute the WF satisfying all user and authorization constraints whenever
we have full information on the uncontrollable part before starting the execution.
That is, whenever we know what truth values the Choice blocks will assign to
the associated propositions.
Definition 5 (Weak Controllability). An ACWF under conditional uncer-
tainty is weakly controllable if there exists a viable execution strategy.
Dealing with such a controllability is quite complex as it always requires one
to predict how all uncontrollable parts will behave before starting the execution
(i.e., to predict which the scenario will be). This lead us to considering the op-
posite case, the one in which we want to synthesize a strategy returning a static
schedule working for all combinations of truth value assignments (i.e., for all
scenarios) before starting the execution. Thus, the second kind of controllability
is strong controllability, which ensures that we can preassign users to tasks be-
fore starting, being guaranteed that such an assignment will always satisfy all
constraints whatever the truth value assignments.
Definition 6 (Strong Controllability). An ACWF under conditional uncer-
tainty is strongly controllable if there exists a viable execution strategy σ such
that for any pair of scenarios s1, s2 ∈ I and any shared task t belonging to the
WF-paths arising from the projections of s1, s2, we have that [σ(s1)]t = [σ(s2)]t.
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Strong controllability is, however, “too strong”. If an ACWF is not strongly
controllable, it could be still executable deciding which user to commit to which
task by reacting to the uncontrollable parts as soon as they become known.
To achieve this purpose, we introduce dynamic controllability. An ACWF is
dynamically controllable if it admits a viable execution strategy able to modify
its associated schedule (if needed) whenever a truth value for a still unknown
proposition becomes known due to the execution of the associated conditional
split connector. Since the truth values of propositions are revealed incrementally,
in what follows we introduce the formal definition of history that we then use
to define dynamic controllability.
Definition 7 (History). The history H(t, s) of a task t in the scenario s con-
sists of the set of truth value assignments to the propositions made by the con-
ditional split connectors executed before task t in s.
Take Fig. 1 as an example and consider the scenario s(e) = >. It holds
that H(CardioEv, s) = ∅ before executing the conditional split connector and
H(EM-Treat, s) = {e} after executing the conditional split connector.
Definition 8 (Dynamic Controllability). An ACWF is dynamically con-
trollable if there exists a viable execution strategy σ such that for any pair of
scenarios s1, s2 ∈ I and any task t belonging to the WF-path arising from the
projection s1, it holds that if H(t, s1) = H(t, s2), then t belongs to the WF-path
arising from the projection of s2, and [σ(s1)]t = [σ(s2)]t.
That is, an ACWF is dynamically controllable if there exists an execution
strategy assigning users to incoming tasks consistently, knowing only the val-
ues of propositions associated to conditional split connectors already executed,
besides the users assigned to previous tasks.
6 Encoding WF-Paths into Constraint Networks
As we have discussed previously, a WF-path is the projection of a particular
scenario. Uncontrollable parts no longer exist in this projection.
We focus on tasks only, implicitly considering that the WfMS takes care of
executing the connectors and that no constraints between connectors exist.
To encode a WF-path into a CN suitable for our purposes, we first turn
the current partial order between tasks into a total one d = (t1, . . . , tn), where
t1, . . . , tn ∈ T . In this way, we can guarantee an efficient (dynamic) user as-
signment during execution as we exploit directional consistency. Recall that a
dynamic assignment of values (i.e., users) to variables (i.e., tasks) no matter the
order in which the variables are chosen (i.e., tasks executed by users) has already
been proved to be NP-hard in [10]. Instead, following an order when assigning
the variables has been proved to be linear [7,8] after checking the consistency of
the initial CN, which remains NP-hard.
Indeed, the initial checking does not worry about computing a solution, but it
only focuses on proving that at least a solution exists by tightening the network
(this is the hard part).
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EM-Treat {D, E}
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Fig. 4: (Binary) Constraint networks for WF-path 1 (a), WF-path 2 (b), and the
super-path modeling the whole WF turned unconditional (c). The order of tasks
has to be interpreted bottom-up (↑).
In this paper, we accept that the initial check of consistency on these equiv-
alent CNs is NP-hard in favor of guaranteeing an efficient (dynamic) execution.
Of course, the more users, tasks and Choice blocks a WF specifies, the more
this approach becomes intractable in its preliminary phase.
We start from a single WF-path and we encode it in an equivalent CN
R = 〈X,D,C〉. We fill X with the set of tasks belonging to the WF-path un-
der analysis. Considering WF-path 1, we have that X = {CardioEv, NeuroEv,
EM-Treat, ICU-Hosp, DischLet}. We now restrict the current partial order so
that it becomes total. In this WF-path, the unordered tasks are CardioEv and
NeuroEv, and, as we previously said in § 2, we assume that CardioEv exe-
cutes first. Thus, the order is d = (CardioEv, NeuroEv, EM-Treat, ICU-Hosp,
DischLet), where CardioEv and DischLet are the first and the last task, re-
spectively. As for classic ordered CNs, we show the graphical representation of
the ordered tasks of WF-path 1 in Fig. 4a. We interpret the figure bottom-up
(↑). For each variable xi modeling the task ti, the corresponding domain of the
variable consists of all users authorized for ti, i.e., Dti = users(ti). For WF-path
1, DCardioEv = DNeuroEv = {A, B, C}, DEM-Treat = {D, E}, DICU-Hosp = DDischLet =
{B, C, D}. We show these domains on the right of the variables in Fig. 4a.
We initialize the set C of constraints as follows. For each pair of tasks t1, t2
connected by an authorization constraint (labeled by ρ1∧· · ·∧ρn) in the original
WF-path, we add to C the relation Rt1 t2 = ρ1 ∩ · · · ∩ ρn as the set of all tuples
(ui, uj) satisfying the resulting relation where ui ∈ Dt1 and uj ∈ Dt2 . Any
tuple (ui, uj) of Rt1 t2 means that if task t1 is assigned to user ui and task t2 is
assigned to user uj , then the original authorization constraint between t1 and t2
is satisfied. For instance, we encode 6= ∧¬Rel between CardioEv and NeuroEv as
the binary relation RCN (Table 1a). To ease reading, we shorten the subscript
of each relation with the first letters of the two tasks it constrains.
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Table 1: Relations of the example in Fig. 1. Initial: RCN , RCD (common) RCI ,
REI , RID (WF-path 1), and RCS , RSD (WF-path 2). Generated: RCE , R
1
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We do the same with the authorization constraints between CardioEv and
ICU-Hosp (RCI , Table 1i), CardioEv and DischLet (RCD , Table 1b), EM-Treat
and ICU-Hosp (REI , Table 1c), and ICU-Hosp and DischLet (RID , Table 1f).
We proceed similarly for WF-path 2 (we show its CN in Fig. 4b).
7 Weak, Strong and Dynamic Controllability Checking
We now address the algorithmic part for weak, strong and dynamic controllabil-
ity defined in § 5.
7.1 Weak Controllability Checking
Weak Controllability Checking (WC-checking) simply checks that each CN en-
coding a WF-path is consistent. Once we have encoded each WF-path in a CN,
we can simply employ any algorithm for directional consistency we like and run
it on each one of these networks as input. If these CNs are all consistent, then
the WF is weakly controllable.
In our example, we use adc (discussed in § 3.2). Fig. 5a shows the run of
adc for the CN of WF-path 1 (Fig. 4a), whereas Fig. 5b shows the run for
the CN of WF-path 2 (Fig.4b). More precisely, for WF-path 1 we start from
the equivalent CN R = 〈X,D,C〉 along with the order d we discussed in the
second half of § 6. adc processes the variables (i.e., tasks) top down (↓) by
filling the corresponding buckets with the relations in C (Table 1) as we dis-
cussed at the end of § 3.2. Initial relations appear on the left of ‖, whereas new
ones generated by the algorithm appear on the right. adc starts by processing
Bucket(DischLet) by computing the new scope A = {C,D, I} \ {D} = {C, I}.
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Bucket(DischLet) : RCD , RID‖





Bucket(DischLet) : RCD , RSD‖
Bucket(STD-Tr) : RCS‖
Bucket(NeuroEv) : RCN ‖
Bucket(CardioEv) : ‖R2C
(b) WF-path2.
Fig. 5: adc run on WF-path1 and WF-path2.
It then computes (i.e., infers the implicit possibly missing) relational constraints
RCI = piC ,I (RCD ./ RID). Since we will assign ICU-Hosp after CardioEv (as in
WF-path 1 ICU-Hosp is the latest variable in the set {ICU-Hosp, CardioEv}), we
add RCI to Bucket(ICU-Hosp). Actually, since Bucket(ICU-Hosp) already con-
tains RCI , adding the new one is equivalent to tightening the existing one to the
intersection between itself and this new one. But since this intersection results in
the same RCI , adc does nothing. Also, since the generated RCI 6= ∅, adc goes
ahead by processing Bucket(ICU-Hosp). This time, the scope of the generated
constraint is A = {C, I, E} \ {I} = {C,E}. Therefore, adc computes RCE =
piC ,E (RCI ./ REI ) (Table 1d) and adds it to Bucket(EM-Treat) since the bucket
is empty and EM-Treat comes after CardioEv. Since REI 6= ∅, adc now takes
into account EM-Treat, by computing the new scope A = {C,E}\{E} = {C}. It
then computes R1C = piC(RCE ) (Table 1e) and adds to Bucket(CardioEv). This
(node-consistency) constraint rules out A for CardioEv. Again, R1C 6= ∅ so adc
processes Bucket(NeuroEv) resulting in no tightening for Bucket(CardioEv) (it
just generates (again an) R1C = piC(RCN ), which does not imply any new tight-
ening for R1C in Bucket(CardioEv)). Since adc did not come across any empty
relation, the CN in Fig. 4a is consistent.
We proceed similarly for WF-path 2. This time adc eventually generates R2C
(Table 1j) ruling out C for CardioEv.
Our example is weakly controllable. A viable strategy is σ is σ(e) = ψe and
σ(¬e) = ψ¬e, where ψe(CardioEv) = C, ψe(NeuroEv) = A, ψe(EM-Treat) = E,
ψe(ICU-Hosp) = C, ψe(DischLet) = B (WF-path 1), whereas ψ¬e(CardioEv) =
A, ψ¬e(NeuroEv) = C, ψ¬e(STD-Tr) = A, ψ¬e(DischLet) = D (WF-path 2).
The time complexity of WC-checking is O(2mn(2z)w?+1). Indeed, it corre-
sponds to the complexity of adc multiplied for the number of possible different
WF-paths, which in the worst case are 2m when considering a sequence of m
Choice blocks. However, the complexity of the execution is linear in the number
of the tasks (the strategy σ has already been synthesized).
7.2 Strong Controllability Checking
Strong Controllability Checking (SC-checking) does not need to unfold all WF-
paths and test them independently. SC-checking works as follows. We first turn
every conditional split connector × into a total one + (i.e., all Choice blocks
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become Parallel ones). Then, we encode this (now unique) super-path into a CN
exactly as we discussed in §6 for a single WF-path and run again any algorithm
for directional consistency in order to synthesize a strategy σ(s) working no
matter s. We show the corresponding CN in Fig. 4c.
Our example is not strongly controllable. Indeed, any viable strategy σ im-
plies ψ(CardioEv) = B, the only conservative choice for CardioEv not having any
information on which WF-path we will have to take. This implies in turn that
both ψ(ICU-Hosp) = B and ψ(STD-Tr) = B (recall that the authorization con-
straints between CardioEv and ICU-Hosp (WF-path 1) and between CardioEv
and STD-Tr (WF-path 2) are both labeled by =). Now, since there are two au-
thorization constraints connecting ICU-Hosp, STD-Tr to DischLet labeled by ρ1
and ρ2, we can see that there is no valid user for DischLet as ψ(ICU-Hosp) = B
implies ψ(DischLet) = C, whereas ψ(STD-Tr) = B implies ψ(DischLet) = D.
The time complexity of SC-checking coincides with that of adc after turning
the WF unconditional (linear in the number of tasks and constraints).
7.3 Dynamic Controllability Checking
Dynamic Controllability Checking (DC-checking) refines the WC-checking by
reasoning on the labels of tasks shared by different WF-paths. In our exam-
ple, WF-path 1 and WF-path 2 share CardioEv, NeuroEv, and DischLet tasks.
These tasks must always be executed since L(CardioEv) = L(NeuroEv) =
L(DischLet) =   (in the initial ACWF under conditional uncertainty).
Approaches such as keeping the intersection of the users authorized for those
tasks with respect to different WF-paths are in general wrong. In our example,
the authorized users for DischLet are {C, B} (WF-path 1), and {D} only (WF-
path 2). Thus, {C, B}∩{D} = ∅ (indeed, the ACWF is not strongly controllable).
The intuition is that given a WF-path along with its total order among tasks,
for each pair of tasks t1 and t2 such that t1 is before t2, we have that L(t2) must
also contain L(t1). Getting back to our example, we have that L(DischLet) = e
because L(ICU-Hosp) = e if we focus on WF-path 1, and L(DischLet) = ¬e
because L(STD-Tr) = ¬e if we focus on WF-path 2. Therefore, our idea is that
of conditionally intersecting the set of authorized users for tasks shared by WF-
paths if and only if the labels of these tasks are consistent.
As a result, a “fixed-point” DC-checking algorithmic approach works in
rounds until no tightening is possible. First, we encode each WF-path into a
CN using the encoding provided in § 6 as we did for weak controllability. Then,
every round is as follows. (1) We run adc on every CN. If one of these CNs is
inconsistent, then the ACWF is not dynamically controllable (this is the certifi-
cate of “no”). (2) For each task t shared by more than one WF-path, we put
in Bucket(t) of each WF-path (containing t) all the relations appearing in the
same bucket of all other WF-paths (containing t) provided that the labels for t
in these different WF-paths are consistent.
In our example, we have that, after running adc on WF-path 1 and WF-
path 2 as input we have generated RCE , and R
1
C = {B, C} (WF-path 1), and
R2C = {A, B} (WF-path 2). Therefore, in the CN encoding WF-path 1 we add
14
R2C to Bucket(CardioEv) and in the CN encoding WF-path 2 we add R
1
C to
Bucket(CardioEv). That is, for both CNs we tighten the unary constraint getting
R1,2C = R
1
C ∩ R2C = {B} (ruling out both A and C since no dynamic strategy
assigning one of these users to CardioEv exists). We do the same with RCN for
both NeuroEv’s buckets resulting in no tightening. We now run again adc on
the two WF-paths since in the previous round we made at least one modification
(we tightened Bucket(CardioEv) in all CNs). In round 2 no tightening occurs, so
the DC-checking terminates. Since no inconsistent WF-path has been detected,
the ACWF under conditional uncertainty is dynamically controllable.
Dynamic controllability ensures that we can synthesize a strategy σ(s) both
oﬄine and online (i.e., during execution) no matter which s is being generated.
We synthesize a strategy oﬄine as we did for WC-controllability. The differ-
ence is that the choices of users for shared tasks have already been restricted.
We (efficiently) synthesize a strategy online by generating a solution as fol-
lows. We start by considering all those WF-paths containing the initial task t
and we assign a user u such that u satisfies all the relations in Bucket(t) (for the
first task Bucket(t) only contains unary relations enforcing node-consistency). If
the ACWF starts with a Choice block, we choose the WF-paths to start from ac-
cording to the truth value observed (in case of nested Choice blocks we proceed
recursively). Then, we execute the next tasks moving from the considered set of
WF-paths to others (more specific) according to the scenario being generated
and picking a user satisfying all relations in their corresponding buckets (that
is, a users satisfying all the constraints between that task and all tasks which
have already been executed).
Our example is dynamically controllable. A viable strategy σ(s) must ini-
tially consider both WF-paths, so the only conservative choice is σ( ) = ψ ,
where ψ (CardioEv) = B. Then, if the conditional connector assigns > to e
the strategy knows it has to go through WF-path 1. Hence, σ(e) = ψe where
ψe(EM-Treat) = D , ψe(ICU-Hosp) = B and ψe(DischLet) = C. Instead, if e = ⊥,
then σ(¬e) = ψ¬e where ψ¬e(STD-Tr) = B and ψ¬e(DischLet) = D. Since every
execution takes into consideration either ICU-Hosp or STD-Tr (as the tasks be-
long to WF-paths which are mutually-exclusive) no authorization constraint is
violated. The time complexity of DC-checking is O(2(m+1)n(2z)w?+1), where 2m
is the number of possible different WF-paths in the worst case and O(n(2z)w?+1)
is the complexity of adc algorithm (see § 3).
8 Related Work
The problem of verifying WF features related to the assignment of agents to
tasks is known in literature as WF satisfiability and resiliency [17]. More specif-
ically, the workflow satisfiability problem (WSP) is the problem of finding an
assignment of users to tasks such that the execution of the WF gets to the
end satisfying all authorization constraints. The workflow resiliency problem is
WSP under the uncertainty that a maximum number of users may become (tem-
porally) absent before or during execution. WSP does not address conditional
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uncertainty. In this work, we exploited controllability analysis to deal with a dy-
namic WSP, where we decide, during execution, which users to assign to which
tasks depending on how the uncontrollable conditional part is behaving.
Other related work lies in the area of temporal networks, where some ex-
tensions injecting users and authorization constraints into the specification have
been provided. In [6], simple temporal networks with uncertainty (STNUs, [14])
are extended with security constraints in order to model temporal role-based
ACWFs in which authorization constraints and temporal constraints mutually
influence one another. Controllability checking has not been addressed for such
an extension. Access-Controlled Temporal Networks (ACTNs) [5] address users
and (conditional) temporal authorization constraints. DC-checking is done via
timed game automata. WC-checking and SC-checking have not been addressed
for ACTNs. Moreover, the analysis phase in [5] (i.e., the checking for DC before
starting) stops as soon as one (oﬄine) dynamic execution strategy is synthesized.
In this work, DC-checking does not synthesize a particular dynamic strategy, but
it handles all possible strategies satisfying the initial constraints.
In [1], Cabanillas et al. address the resource allocation for business processes.
They consider an RBAC environment and they do not impose any particular
order on activities. They also address loops. However, the authors clearly state
that their work is unable to address History-Based Allocation of resources.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
We defined ACWFs under conditional uncertainty by injecting access control
into BPMN. We then gave the semantics for weak, strong and dynamic control-
lability of ACWFs under conditional uncertainty and discussed the algorithmic
approaches to both address these decision problems and synthesize execution
strategies. We also discussed the complexity of WC, SC, and DC-checking. For
classic (unconditional) CSPs if such relations are monotone (e.g., =) the check-
ing is done in n3 where n is the number of tasks [13]. The same holds for non-
monotone relations if each task has no more that 2 users authorized. In general,
the problem is NP-hard. Adding conditions can only make it worse. However,
adc considerably speeds up the analysis (for the general CSP) allowing one to
compute the necessary level of consistency to guarantee that a solution can be
generated without backtracking. Once this check is done, every solution (i.e.,
assignment of users to tasks) can be generated in polynomial time. This means
that the runtime phase is tractable.
As future work, we plan to implement and verify our approach on real-world
ACWFs, where, as in the clinical domain, sophisticated security policies need
to be specified, managed and enforced while executing the WF. We also plan to
benchmark the proposed algorithms once we have carried out a more thorough
analysis on how to compute the most conservative order for tasks. This is because
for some WF instances the answer “dynamic controllable” or “uncontrollable”
depends on how the tasks have been ordered.
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